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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TARA KAY MAST, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20000889-CA 
Priority No. 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The federal constitutional guarantee of due process, the Utah constitutional right to 
appeal, and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999) prevent the imposition of a fine and attorney's 
fees upon Appellant Tara Kay Mast ["Ms. Mast''] in the event that this Court determines that the 
restitution portion of her original sentence exceeded statutory limitations. The imposition of a 
fine and attorney's fees would add two new elements to Ms. Mast's sentence that were absent 
from her original sentence. This addition is expressly prohibited under cases interpreting Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999). State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179,181 (Utah 1981); State v. 
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 73, 979 P.2d 799. It also violates state constitutional guarantees. State v. 
Babbel 813 P.2d 86, 87-88 (Utah 1991). Further, if this addition is justified on the basis that Ms. 
Mast's ability to endure it has increased because of her successful appeal of the restitution 
portion of her original sentence, undertones of vindictiveness are strongly suggested and this is 
a direct violation of Ms. Mast's federal due process rights. North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 
711, 725-26 (1969). Therefore, the State's argument that a fine and attorney's fees should be 
imposed upon Ms. Mast in the event that this Court determines that the restitution portion of her 
original sentence was illegal should be rejected. 
ARGUMENT 
FINES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT BE REINSTATED IN THIS 
CASE BECAUSE THE REINSTATEMENT WOULD RESULT IN A HARSHER 
SENTENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. AND 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-3-405 
The State attempts to circumvent established authority by arguing that this Court should 
instruct the sentencing court to reinstate previously-suspended fines and attorney's fees in the 
event that the restitution order is vacated. However, such an instruction would violate 
constitutional and statutory protections which prevent courts from imposing harsher sentences, 
or increasing the number of elements of sentences, after successful appeals by criminal 
defendants. 
The federal constitutional guarantee of due process, U.S. Const, amend. V, extended to 
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a sentencing court from imposing a harsher 
sentence upon a defendant after appeal unless vindictiveness against a defendant for having 
successfully appealed plays no part in the sentencing. North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711, 
725 (1969). In North Carolina v. Pearce. the United States Supreme Court observed that, "since 
the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to 
appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process [] requires that a defendant be freed 
of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge." Id Due 
process does not prevent the imposition of a harsher sentence in all cases, but it requires a 
sentencing judge to base such a sentence upon "objective information concerning identifiable 
conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing 
2 
proceeding." Id. at 726 (emphasis added). This information must be included in the record so 
that it may be fully reviewed on appeal. Id, 
In Utah, the imposition of a harsher sentence after appeal is even more suspect because 
the Utah Constitution contains two provisions protecting a criminal defendant's right to appeal. 
State v. Babbel 813 P.2d 86, 87 (Utah 1991). Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
protects the fundamental right of criminal defendants to appeal,1 and Article VIII, section 5 
guarantees appeals as a matter of right from all courts with original jurisdiction.2 With regard to 
these provisions, the Utah Supreme Court has held that: 
The purpose of an appeal is to promote justice by ferreting out erroneous 
judgments. That purpose is not promoted by imposing on a defendant who 
demonstrates the error of his conviction the risk that he may be penalized with a 
harsher sentence for having done so. An erroneous judgment of conviction is as 
much an affront to society's interest in the fair administration of justice as it is to 
an individual's rights. 
Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88 (quoting Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980)). 
Even more stringent than the Utah constitutional protections is the protection provided by 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999). This Court has recognized that "[s]ection 76-3-405 
unambiguously provides that when a conviction or sentence is set aside on appeal, the trial court 
cannot impose a new sentence that is more severe than the prior sentence." State v. Maguire. 924 
P.2d 904, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).3 Recently, the Utah Supreme Court has reiterated that "[t]he 
1
 Utah Const, art. I, § 12. The full text of this provision is provided in Addendum A. 
2
 Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5. The full text of this provision is provided in Addendum B. 
3
 Section 76-3-405(1) provides that: 
Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on 
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense 
or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than 
meaning of a "more severe' sentence is clear. xThe second sentence cannot exceed the first in 
appearance or effect, in the number of its elements, or in their magnitude."' State v. Bakalov, 
1999 UT 45, % 73, 979 P.2d 799 (quoting State v. Sorensen. 639 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981)). "It 
also precludes justifying an increase in one element of a sentence by reference to a decrease in 
another element.... This is because the possibility of such a tradeoff could act as a deterrent to 
appeal by an individual defendant." Sorensen, 639 P.2d at 181. 
Several cases decided under section 76-3-405 are directly on point. In State v. Bakalov, 
the Utah Supreme Court disallowed the imposition of a fine, in addition to prison time, where 
the original sentence imposed prison time only. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^  74. Even more pertinent 
is State v. Sorensen. There, the Utah Supreme Court vacated a second sentence requiring a 
defendant to serve 1 to 15 years in prison where the original sentence of 1 to 15 years had been 
suspended by the sentencing court. Sorensen. 639 P.2d at 180-81. In that case, the State 
attempted to justify the second sentence by pointing out that the original sentence had included 
two years of probation with the conditions that the defendant serve six months in the county jail 
and pay full restitution of approximately $45,000. Id. Because the second sentence did not 
impose these conditions, the State argued, the cumulative affect was not greater than the original 
sentence. Id. at 181. The Court rejected that argument, stating that under section 76-3-405 uno 
new element of sentence can be added and that no element can be augmented in magnitude." Id. 
This Court has agreed. In State v. Maguire this Court vacated a sentence for consecutive prison 
terms where the original imposed concurrent terms. Maguire. 924 P.2d at 907. In that case, this 
the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(1) (1999). 
4 
Court emphasized that "[t]he plain meaning of section 76-3-405 indicates that a court is barred 
from ever resentencing an individual to a harsher second sentence following a successful 
appeal." LI4 
Here, the imposition of fines and attorney's fees would add two new elements to Ms. 
Mast's sentence that were not there before. Previously, 180 days of jail time, probation, and 
restitution was imposed upon her, and the other elements of the sentence were suspended. R. 45-
47.5 If this Court determines that the restitution order exceeds statutory limitations, then the 
imposition of previously-suspended elements of the sentence cannot be justified on the basis that 
Ms. Mast's ability to endure these elements has now increased because of the reversal of an 
illegal restitution sentence. It is precisely circumstances such as these that lead to a chilling 
effect on criminal defendants' rights to appeal, and constitutional and statutory provisions 
prohibit this. See Sorensen. 639 P.2d at 181 (State cannot justify an increase in one element of a 
4
 In a distinguishable case, State v. Mitchell, this Court upheld a sentence imposing a 
term of 1 to 15 years, a consecutive term of 1 to 5 years under an enhancement provision, and a 
fine where the original sentence had imposed life in prison only. State v. Mitchell. 824 P.2d 469, 
472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This Court acknowledged that "there could be tradeoff of elements, 
such as an increase in one element of a sentence by reference to a decrease in another element." 
Id. However, this Court reasoned, the enhancement and fine had not been available by statute at 
the time of the defendant's original conviction and so the second sentence was permissible. Id. 
This Court noted that "[a]t the time defendant was convicted of manslaughter (his second 
conviction), the trial court imposed the maximum statutory penalties for the offense. The trial 
court did not trade elements off between the first and second sentences." Id. 
Mitchell is distinguishable from the case at bar because there has been no change in 
section 75-3-201 since Ms. Mast's original conviction. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-201 (1999). 
Further, because this appeal focuses upon Ms. Mast's sentence and not her conviction, the 
possibility for conviction of a different crime is not available, and so no new elements or facts 
will be available for consideration at a second sentencing. 
5
 The original sentence suspended the prison term, the fine, and attorney's fees. R. 45-46, 
70 [13]. The court ordered Ms. Mast to serve 180 days in jail, placed her on three years of 
probation, and required her to pay restitution in the amount of $5,090. R. 45-47, 70 [9]. 
5 
sentence by reference to a decrease in another element because "the possibility of such a tradeoff 
could act as a deterrent to appeal by an individual defendant"); Maguire, 924 P.2d at 906 (under 
the federal constitutional due process clause a harsher second sentence cannot be derived from 
vindictiveness toward the defendant for exercising his right to appeal because this would "'chill 
the exercise of basic constitutional rights . . . .'")(citation omitted)). 
The State argues, however, that: 
If this court determines that the sentencing court erred in requiring restitution for 
losses occasioned by the theft of items not received, the restitution order will be 
reduced from $5090 to $440. Should the sentencing court reimpose the fine and 
recoupment fee, the court would require defendant to pay a total of $1660, far less 
than the original restitution order. 
Appellee Br. 16. Thus, the State argues, the sentence would be "clearly and measurably less 
harsh than the original." Id. at 18. 
However, this reasoning is a classic example of "justifying an increase in one element of 
a sentence by reference to a decrease in another element...," and is impermissible under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (1999). Sorensen. 639 P.2d at 181. Additionally, it violates Ms. Mast's 
due process rights under the federal constitution because it is not based upon "identifiable 
conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing 
proceeding." Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726 (emphasis added). It also tramples Ms. Mast's Utah 
constitutional rights to appeal because it imposes a harsher sentence upon Ms. Mast through a 
fine and attorney's fees that were not previously imposed. See BabbeL 813 P.2d at 88 ("The 
purpose behind these [constitutional] provisions is to prevent the chilling effect on the 
constitutional right to appeal which the possibility of a harsher sentence would have on a 
defendant who might be able to demonstrate reversible error in his conviction."). In short, the 
State's argument ignores established constitutional, statutory, and case law in order to secure an 
6 
alternative punishment for Ms. Mast in the event that an original method is found to be illegal. 
This argument has undertones of vindictiveness, and as such it is absolutely prohibited by 
constitutional and statutory provisions. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725; Sorensen, 639 P.2d at 181. 
Moreover, the State's calculation with regard to the reduction in restitution which would 
occur if Ms. Mast is successful on appeal is inaccurate. Although the State does not indicate how 
it calculated its figures, Appellee Br. 16, the calculations are apparently based upon information 
from the Presentence Investigation Report regarding losses from the burglary of Curtis Belnap's 
house. R. 72 [4]. The Report indicates that the $5,090 in restitution which Ms. Mast was ordered 
by the trial court to pay breaks down as follows: 
Item Stolen in Burglary Value/Replacement Cost 
Checks $40 
Two days lost wages $400 
Large water bottle w/money $3,500 
Two stereo speakers $ 1,100 
Day planner $50 
TOTAL LOSS: $5,090 
Id. The State argues that the restitution order would be reduced to $440 in the event that this 
Court finds the restitution exceeds statutory limitations. This apparently includes the 
replacement cost of the checks, $40, and two days' lost wages, $400. However, these items 
should not be included. Ms. Mast pled guilty to Theft by Receiving and admitted that she had 
been in the possession of four rings and a pocket watch. R. 17. These items were returned. R. 71 
[9]. The replacement value of the checks is not attributable to Ms. Mast because she did not 
admit to being in possession of all of the stolen checks. Additionally, there is no indication that 
7 
Mr. Belnap's lost wages were the result of Ms. Mast's crime of Theft by Possession, and not the 
result of the burglary itself. Thus, the restitution should not be reduced to $440, as suggested by 
the State, but to $0 because Ms. Mast has returned the property which she was in possession of. 
R. 71 [9].6 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, the State's argument that a fine and attorney's fees should be 
reinstated in the event that this Court determines that the restitution imposed upon Ms. Mast 
exceeded statutory limitations should be rejected. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Hit day of May, 2001. 
H^HERJd^MNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JARED W. ELDRIDGE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
6
 Additionally, even if $440 was attributable to Ms. Mast, the total amount of the fine and 
attorney's fees, in addition to the $440 is $1,640, and not $1,660, as indicated by the State. 
Appellee Br. 16. This is based upon a fine of $1,000 and attorney's fees of $200. R. 45-47. 
8 
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copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells 
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this H-tiL day of May, 2001. 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's Office as 
indicated above this day of May, 2001. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Art. I, § 12 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid 
because it delegates to industrial commission 
the power to hear, consider and determine con-
troversies between litigants as to ultimate lia-
bility, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246,194 P. 122 
(1920). 
Dependents of employee killed by acts of 
third party, a stranger to employment, are not 
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Is-
sues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248. 
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next 
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L. Rev. 266. 
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplin-
ary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275. 
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319 
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of 
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 47. 
Recent Developments m Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 
Utah L. Rev. 129. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitu-
tional Law §§ 613 to 617. 
C.J.S. — 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§§ 1428 to 1437. 
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants, 
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6. 
limited to recovery under Workmen's Compen-
sation Act exclusively, unless they have as-
signed their rights to insurance carrier Robin-
son v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P 9 
(1927). 
Cited in Wrolstad v Industrial Comm'n, 786 
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
criminal trial in order to preserve confidential-
ity of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or 
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal tnal 
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55 
A.L.R.4th 1196 
False light invasion of privacy—defenses 
and remedies, 57 A.LR4th 244 
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or other-
wise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as 
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57 
A.L.R.4th 404 
Libel or slander defamation by statement 
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520 
Defamation: designation as scab, 65 
A.L.R.4th 1000 
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfer-
ing with prospective civil action, as actionable, 
70 A.L.R.4th 984. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law 
<*=> 322, 324, 327, 328. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
86 
ADDENDUM B 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Art. VIE, § 5 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — 
Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary 
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by stat-
ute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be 
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme 
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1943, S.J.R. 2; 
1984 (2nd S.S.), S.J.R, 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — Provisions similar to 
those in this section were formerly found in 
Art. Vm, Sees. 7, 8 and 9. 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Appeal by the state in criminal cases. 
Appeal where case originated in circuit court. 
Appeals. 
City court supervision. 
Defendant's right to appeal. 
District court jurisdiction. 
—Appellate. 
—Original. 
Divorce decree. 
Equity as distinguished from law case. 
Extraordinary writs. 
Final judgment. 
Habeas corpus. 
Invoking jurisdiction. 
Juvenile court supervision. 
Legislative enlargement or abridgement of 
powers. 
Review in cases at law. 
Review of evidence in equity cases. 
Right to appeal. 
Summary appellate disposition. 
Temporary restraining orders. 
Cited. 
In general. 
Although district courts of this state are 
courts of original jurisdiction, having jurisdic-
tion in all matters both civil and criminal 
which are not excepted by law or the Constitu-
tion, one district court has no power to exercise 
control over another. Nielson v. Schiller, 92 
Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937). 
Appeal by the state in criminal cases. 
This section does not grant the state a gen-
eral right of appeal in criminal cases. State v. 
Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977). 
Cross-References. — Original and appel-
late jurisdiction, § 78-3-4. 
Appeal where case originated in circuit 
court. 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to entertain 
appeals from district court decisions where the 
case originated in a circuit court and involved 
a constitutional issue; Supreme Court's juris-
diction was not limited, as is its jurisdiction 
over appeals from a district court decision 
where the case originated in a justice court, to 
cases involving the constitutionality or valid-
ity of a statute. State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 
(Utah 1983). 
Appeals. 
The district courts of this state had appellate 
jurisdiction insofar as entertaining appeals of 
decisions rendered by board of registration of 
trades and professions revoking license of phy-
sicians. Baker v. Department of Registration, 
78 Utah 424, 3 P.2d 1082 (1931). 
District judge who was called to another dis-
trict to try a case did not have jurisdiction to 
settle bill of exceptions in his home district. 
Jenkins v. Forsey, 83 Utah 527, 30 P.2d 220 
(1934). 
Right to appeal is valuable and constitu-
tional right and should not be denied except 
where it is clear that right has been lost or 
abandoned. Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 
52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). 
City court supervision. 
District court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over misdemeanor assault and battery prosecu-
tion; jurisdiction over the person was conferred 
by accused's stipulation that case might be 
transferred from city court to district court and 
his appearance in latter court; fact that prose-
cution was initiated by complaint rather than 
indictment or information did not preclude dis-
trict court jurisdiction. Jardine v. Harris, 63 
Utah 560, 227 P. 1029 (1924). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
189 
